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<title>Dr. Clarke's Second Reply</title>
<author xml:id="sc"><persName key="nameid_38" sort="Clarke, Samuel" ref="nameid_38" xml:base="http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/catalogue/xml/persNames.xml">Samuel Clarke</persName></author>

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<note type="metadataLine">1717, <hi rend="italic">c.</hi> 1,831 words.</note>
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<linkGrp n="document_relations" xml:base="http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/normalized/"><ptr type="next_part" target="THEM00230">Mr. Leibniz's Third Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr><ptr type="parent" target="THEM00224"><hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)</ptr><ptr type="previous_part" target="THEM00228">Mr. Leibniz's Second Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr></linkGrp>
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<change when="2001-01-01" type="metadata">Catalogue information compiled by Rob Iliffe, Peter Spargo &amp; John Young</change>
<change when="2005-10-01">Base Text of 1738 edition transcribed by <name xml:id="ET">Emily Tector</name></change>
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<head rend="center" xml:id="hd1"><hi rend="italic">Dr</hi>. <hi rend="smallCaps">Clarke</hi>'<hi rend="italic">s Second Reply</hi>.</head>
<p xml:id="par1">1. WHen I said that the <hi rend="italic">Mathematical Principles of Philosophy</hi> are opposite to those of the <hi rend="italic">Materialists</hi>; the Meaning was, that whereas <hi rend="italic">Materialists</hi> suppose the Frame of Nature to be such, as could have arisen from mere <hi rend="italic">Mechanical</hi> Principles of <hi rend="italic">Matter</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Motion</hi>, of <hi rend="italic">Necessity</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Fate</hi>; the <hi rend="italic">Mathematical Principles of Philosophy</hi> show on the contrary, that the State of Things [the <hi rend="italic">Constitution</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">Sun and Planets</hi>] is such as could not arise from any thing but an <hi rend="italic">Intelligent</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Free Cause</hi>. As to the Propriety of the <hi rend="italic">Name</hi>; so far as <hi rend="italic">Metaphysical</hi> Consequences follow demonstratively from <hi rend="italic">Mathematical</hi> Principles, so far the <hi rend="italic">Mathematical</hi> Principles may (if it be thought fit) be called <hi rend="italic">Metaphysical</hi> Principles.</p>
<p rend="indent0" xml:id="par2">'Tis very true, that nothing <hi rend="italic">is</hi>, without a sufficient <hi rend="italic">Reason why</hi> it <hi rend="italic">is</hi>, and why it is <hi rend="italic">thus</hi> rather than <hi rend="italic">otherwise</hi>. And therefore, where there is <hi rend="italic">no Cause</hi>, there can be <hi rend="italic">no Effect</hi>. But this <hi rend="italic">sufficient Reason</hi> is oft-<fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">times</fw><pb xml:id="p39" n="39"/>times no other, than the <hi rend="italic">mere Will</hi> of God. For instance; Why <hi rend="italic">This</hi> particular System of Matter, should be created in <hi rend="italic">one</hi> particular Place, and <hi rend="italic">That</hi> in <hi rend="italic">another</hi> particular Place; when, (<hi rend="italic">all Place</hi> being absolutely indifferent to <hi rend="italic">all Matter</hi>,) it would have been exactly the same thing <hi rend="italic">vice versa</hi>, supposing the two <hi rend="italic">Systems</hi> [or the <hi rend="italic">Particles</hi>] of Matter to be <hi rend="italic">alike</hi>; there can be <hi rend="italic">no other Reason</hi>, but the <hi rend="italic">mere Will</hi> of God. Which if it <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. 4.</note> could in No Case act without a predetermining Cause, any more than a <hi rend="italic">Balance</hi> can move without a preponderating Weight; this would tend to take away all Power of <hi rend="italic">Chusing</hi>, and to introduce <hi rend="italic">Fatality</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par3">2. Many Ancient <hi rend="italic">Greeks</hi>, who had their Philosophy from the <hi rend="italic">Phœnicians</hi>, and whose Philosophy was corrupted by <hi rend="italic">Epicurus</hi>, held indeed in general <hi rend="italic">Matter</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Vacuum</hi>; but they knew not how to apply those Principles by <hi rend="italic">Mathematicks</hi>, to the Explication of the <hi rend="italic">Phænomena of Nature</hi>.  How <hi rend="italic">Small</hi> soever the <hi rend="italic">Quantity</hi> of Matter be, God has not at all the less Subject to exercise his Wisdom and Power upon: For, <hi rend="italic">Other</hi> Things, as well as <hi rend="italic">Matter</hi>, are equally Subjects, on which God exercises his Power and Wisdom. By the <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">same</fw><pb xml:id="p41" n="41"/>same Argument it might just as well have been proved, that <hi rend="italic">Men</hi>, or any other particular Species of Beings, must be <hi rend="italic">infinite in Number</hi>, <choice><sic>least</sic><corr>lest</corr></choice> God should want Subjects, on which to exercise his Power and Wisdom.</p>
<p xml:id="par4">3. The Word <hi rend="italic">Sensory</hi> does not properly signify the <hi rend="italic">Organ</hi>, but the <hi rend="italic">Place</hi> of Sensation. The <hi rend="italic">Eye</hi>, the <hi rend="italic">Ear</hi>, &amp;c. are <hi rend="italic">Organs</hi>, but not <hi rend="italic">Sensoria</hi>. Besides, Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac Newton</hi> <note n="✝"><hi rend="italic">See the</hi> Note <hi rend="italic">in my First Reply</hi>, §. 3.</note> does not say, that <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is the <hi rend="italic">Sensory</hi>; but that it is, by way of Similitude only, <hi rend="italic">as it were</hi> the Sensory, <hi rend="italic">&amp;c</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par5">4. It was never supposed, that the <hi rend="italic">Presence</hi> of the Soul was <hi rend="italic">sufficient</hi>, but only that it is <hi rend="italic">necessary</hi> in order to Perception. <hi rend="italic">Without being present</hi> to the Images of the Things perceived, it could not possibly perceive them: But <hi rend="italic">being present</hi> is not <hi rend="italic">sufficient</hi>, without it be also a <hi rend="italic">Living Substance</hi>. Any <hi rend="italic">inanimate</hi> Substance, tho' <hi rend="italic">present</hi>, perceives nothing: And a <hi rend="italic">Living</hi> Substance can only <hi rend="italic">there</hi> perceive, where it is <hi rend="italic">present</hi> either to the <hi rend="italic">Things themselves</hi>, (as the Omnipresent God is to the whole Universe;) or to the <hi rend="italic">Images</hi> of Things, (as the Soul of Man is in its proper Sensory.) Nothing can any more <hi rend="italic">Act</hi>, or <hi rend="italic">be Acted <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">upon</fw><pb xml:id="p43" n="43"/>upon</hi>, where it is not present; than it can <hi rend="italic">Be</hi>, where it is not. The Soul's being <hi rend="italic">Indivisible</hi>, does not prove it to be present <hi rend="italic">only in a mere Point</hi>. <hi rend="italic">Space</hi>, finite or infinite, is <hi rend="italic">absolutely indivisible</hi>, even so much as in <hi rend="italic">Thought</hi>; (To imagine its Parts moved from each other, is to imagine them <note n="*">Ut partium Temporis Ordo est immutabilis, sic etiam Ordo partium <hi rend="italic">Spatij</hi>. Moveantur hæ de locis suis, &amp; movebuntur (ut ita dicam) <hi rend="italic">de Seipsis</hi>. <hi rend="italic">Newton. Principia, Schol. ad Defin</hi>. 8.</note> moved <hi rend="italic">out of themselves</hi>;) and yet <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is <hi rend="italic">not a mere Point</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par6">5. <hi rend="italic">God</hi> perceives Things, not indeed by his simple <hi rend="italic">Presence</hi> to them, nor yet by his <hi rend="italic">Operation</hi> upon them, but by his being a <hi rend="italic">Living</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Intelligent</hi>, as well as an <hi rend="italic">Omnipresent</hi> Substance. The <hi rend="italic">Soul</hi> likewise, (within its narrow Sphere,) not by its simple <hi rend="italic">Presence</hi>, but by its being a <hi rend="italic">Living</hi> Substance, perceives the <hi rend="italic">Images</hi> to which it is <hi rend="italic">present</hi>; and which, <hi rend="italic">without being present</hi> to them, it could not perceive.</p>
<p xml:id="par7">6 &amp; 7. 'Tis very true, that the Excellency of <hi rend="italic">God</hi>'s Workmanship does not consist in its showing the <hi rend="italic">Power</hi> only, but in its showing the <hi rend="italic">Wisdom also</hi> of its Author. <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">But</fw><pb xml:id="p45" n="45"/>But then this <hi rend="italic">Wisdom of God</hi> appears, not in making Nature (as an Artificer makes a Clock) capable of going on <hi rend="italic">Without him:</hi> (For that's <hi rend="italic">impossible</hi>; there being <hi rend="italic">no Powers</hi> of Nature <hi rend="italic">independent</hi> upon <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, as the <hi rend="italic">Powers</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Weights</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Springs</hi> are <hi rend="italic">independent</hi> upon <hi rend="italic">Men:</hi>) But the <hi rend="italic">Wisdom of God</hi> consists, in framing <hi rend="italic">Originally</hi> the <hi rend="italic">perfect</hi> and <hi rend="italic">complete Idea</hi> of a Work, which <hi rend="italic">begun and continues</hi>, according to that Original perfect Idea, by the <hi rend="italic">Continual Uninterrupted Exercise</hi> of his <hi rend="italic">Power</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Government</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par8">8. The Word <hi rend="italic">Correction</hi>, or <hi rend="italic">Amendment</hi>, is to be understood, not with regard to <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, but to <hi rend="italic">Us</hi> only. The present Frame of the Solar System (for instance,) according to the present Laws of Motion, will in time <note n="*"><hi rend="italic">See the</hi> Note <hi rend="italic">on Mr</hi>. Leibnitz'<hi rend="italic">s First</hi> Paper. § 4.</note> <hi rend="italic">fall into Confusion</hi>; and perhaps, after That, will be <hi rend="italic">amended</hi> or put into a <hi rend="italic">new Form</hi>. But this Amendment is only <hi rend="italic">relative</hi>, with regard to <hi rend="italic">Our Conceptions</hi>. In reality, and with regard to <hi rend="italic">God</hi>; the present <hi rend="italic">Frame</hi>, and the consequent <hi rend="italic">Disorder</hi>, and the following <hi rend="italic">Renovation</hi>, are <hi rend="italic">all</hi> equally parts of the Design framed in <choice><sic>Gods</sic><corr>God's</corr></choice> Original <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">perfect</fw><pb xml:id="p47" n="47"/>perfect Idea. 'Tis in the Frame of the <hi rend="italic">World</hi>, as in the Frame of <choice><sic>Mans</sic><corr>Man's</corr></choice> <hi rend="italic">Body:</hi> The <hi rend="italic">Wisdom of God</hi> does not consist, in making the <hi rend="italic">present Frame</hi> of Either of them <hi rend="italic">Eternal</hi>, but to last <hi rend="italic">so long</hi> as <hi rend="italic">he thought fit</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par9">9. The <hi rend="italic">Wisdom</hi> and <note n="‖"><hi rend="italic">See my Sermons preach'd at Mr</hi>. Boyles <hi rend="italic">Lecture</hi>. Part 1. Page 106. Fourth Edition.</note> <hi rend="italic">Foresight</hi> of God, do not consist in <hi rend="italic">providing originally Remedies</hi>, which shall <hi rend="italic">of themselves</hi> cure the Disorders of Nature. For in Truth and Strictness, with regard to God, there are <hi rend="italic">no Disorders</hi>, and consequently <hi rend="italic">no Remedies</hi>, and indeed <hi rend="italic">no Powers</hi> of Nature <hi rend="italic">at all</hi>, that <note n="✝"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. 2.</note> can do any Thing <hi rend="italic">of themselves</hi>, (as <hi rend="italic">Weights</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Springs</hi> Work <hi rend="italic">of themselves</hi> with regard to <hi rend="italic">Men:</hi>) But the <hi rend="italic">Wisdom and Foresight</hi> of God, consist (as has been said) in <hi rend="italic">contriving</hi> at <hi rend="italic">once</hi>, what his <hi rend="italic">Power and Government</hi> is <hi rend="italic">Continually</hi> putting in actual Execution.</p>
<p xml:id="par10">10. God is neither a <hi rend="italic">Mundane</hi> Intelligence, nor a <note n="*"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 1.</note> <hi rend="italic">Supra-Mundane</hi> Intelligence; but an <hi rend="italic">Omnipresent</hi> Intelligence, both <hi rend="italic">In</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Without</hi> the World. He is <hi rend="italic">In</hi> all, and <hi rend="italic">Through</hi> all, as well as <hi rend="italic">Above</hi> all.</p>
<fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">11. If</fw><pb xml:id="p49" n="49"/>
<p xml:id="par11">11. If God's <hi rend="italic">conserving</hi> all Things, means his <hi rend="italic">actual Operation and Government</hi>, in preserving and continuing the Beings, Powers, Orders, Dispositions and Motions of all Things; this is <hi rend="italic">all that is contended for</hi>. But if his <hi rend="italic">conserving</hi> Things, means no more than a King's creating such Subjects, as shall be able to act well enough without his intermeddling or Ordering any thing amongst them ever after; This is making him indeed a <hi rend="italic">real Creator</hi>, but a <hi rend="italic">Governour only Nominal</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par12">12. The Argument in this Paragraph supposes, that whatsoever <hi rend="italic">God</hi> does, is <hi rend="italic">Supernatural</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Miraculous</hi>; and consequently it tends to exclude <hi rend="italic">All Operation</hi> of <hi rend="italic">God</hi> in the <hi rend="italic">Governing and Ordering</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">Natural</hi> World. But the Truth is; <hi rend="italic">Natural</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Supernatural</hi> are nothing at all different with regard to <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, but distinctions merely in <hi rend="italic">Our</hi> Conceptions of things. To cause the <hi rend="italic">Sun</hi> [or <hi rend="italic">Earth</hi>] to <hi rend="italic">move</hi> regularly, is a thing we call <hi rend="italic">Natural:</hi> To <hi rend="italic">stop</hi> its Motion for a Day, we call <hi rend="italic">Supernatural:</hi> But the <hi rend="italic">One</hi> is the Effect of <hi rend="italic">no greater Power</hi>, than the <hi rend="italic">Other</hi>; nor is the <hi rend="italic">One</hi>, with respect to <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, more or less <hi rend="italic">Natural</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Supernatural</hi> than the <hi rend="italic">other</hi>. God's <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">being</fw><pb xml:id="p51" n="51"/>being <hi rend="italic">present In</hi> or <hi rend="italic">To</hi> the World, does not make him to be the <note n="*">Hic [<hi rend="italic">Deus</hi>] omnia regit, non ut <hi rend="italic">Anima Mundi</hi>, sed ut universorum <hi rend="italic">Dominus. — Deus</hi> est vox relativa, &amp; ad <hi rend="italic">Servos</hi> refertur; &amp; <hi rend="italic">Deitas</hi> est Dominatio Dei, non in <hi rend="italic">corpus propium</hi>, sed in <hi rend="italic">Servos</hi>. — In ipso continentur &amp; moventur universa, sed abs<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> mutuâ <hi rend="italic">passione</hi>. Deus nihil patitur ex corporum Motibus; illa nullam sentiunt resistentiam ex Omnipræsentiâ Dei. — <hi rend="italic">Corpore omni</hi> &amp; figurâ corporeâ prorsus destituitur; ideo<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> videri non potest, nec audiri, nec tangi, nec sub specie rei alicujus corporei coli debet. Ideas habemus <hi rend="italic">Attributorum</hi> ejus; sed quid sit rei alicujus <hi rend="italic">Substantia</hi>, minimè cognoscimus. — Intimas [<hi rend="italic">corporum</hi>] Substantias nullo Sensu, nulla actione reflexâ cognoscimus, &amp; multò minus Ideam habemus Substantiæ Dei. Hunc cognoscimus solummodò per Proprietates suas &amp; Attributa, &amp; per sapientissimas &amp; optimas rerum structuras, &amp; causas finales; veneramur autem &amp; colimus ob dominium. Deus enim sine Dominio, Providentia, &amp; Causis Finalibus, nihil aliud est quàm Fatum &amp; Natura. i. e. <hi rend="italic">God Governs all Things, not as a</hi> Soul of the World, <hi rend="italic">but as the</hi> Lord of the Universe. — God, <hi rend="italic">is a relative Word, carrying in it the notion of Relation to</hi> Servants. <hi rend="italic">And the</hi> Godhead <hi rend="italic">of God, is His</hi> Dominion: <hi rend="italic">A Dominion, not like that of a Soul over</hi> its own Body, <hi rend="italic">but that of a</hi> Lord over his Servants. — <hi rend="italic">In Him all Things subsist and move, but without a mutual affecting of each other</hi>, [such as is between Soul and Body.] <hi rend="italic">God is no way affected by the Motions of Bodies</hi>; <hi rend="italic">and the Motion of Bodies meets with no Obstruction from the Omnipresence of God. — He is altogether without</hi> Body <hi rend="italic">or</hi> Bodily Shape; <hi rend="italic">and therefore can neither be Seen, nor Heard, <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">nor</fw><pb xml:id="p53-note" n="53"/>nor Felt</hi>; <hi rend="italic">nor ought to be worshipped under the similitude of any Corporeal Thing. We have Ideas of his</hi> Attributes; <hi rend="italic">but what the</hi> Substance <hi rend="italic">of any Thing is, we know not at all. — The very</hi> Substances themselves, <hi rend="italic">even of</hi> Bodies, <hi rend="italic">we cannot come at the knowledge of, either by any of our</hi> Senses, <hi rend="italic">or by any</hi> reflex Act of the Mind: <hi rend="italic">much <choice><sic>le s</sic><corr>less</corr></choice> have we any Idea of the</hi> Substance of God. <hi rend="italic">Him we know, only by his</hi> Properties <hi rend="italic">and</hi> Attributes, <hi rend="italic">and by his most</hi> Wise <hi rend="italic">and</hi> Excellent Disposition <hi rend="italic">of</hi> Things, <hi rend="italic">and by</hi> Final Causes: <hi rend="italic">And we adore and worship him, upon account of his</hi> Dominion. <hi rend="italic">For a</hi> God <hi rend="italic">without</hi> Dominion, <hi rend="italic">without</hi> Providence <hi rend="italic">and</hi> Final Causes, <hi rend="italic">is nothing but</hi> Fate and Nature. <hi rend="italic">Newtoni Principia, Scholium generale sub finem.</hi></note> <hi rend="italic">Soul of the World</hi>. A <hi rend="italic">Soul</hi>, is <hi rend="italic">part</hi> of a <hi rend="italic">Compound</hi>, whereof <hi rend="italic">Body</hi> is the <hi rend="italic">Other</hi> part; and they <hi rend="italic">mutually Affect</hi> each other, as <hi rend="italic">parts</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">same whole</hi>. But <hi rend="italic">God</hi> is <hi rend="italic">present</hi> to the <hi rend="italic">World</hi>, not as a <hi rend="italic">Part</hi>, but as a <hi rend="italic">Governor</hi>; Acting upon all Things, himself acted upon by <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">nothing</fw><pb xml:id="p53" n="53"/>nothing. <hi rend="italic">He is not far from every one of Us, for in him We</hi> (and all Things) <hi rend="italic">live and move and have our Beings</hi>.</p><fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">Mr. <hi rend="smallCaps">Leib</hi>-</fw>
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