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<title>Dr. Clarke's Third Reply</title>
<author xml:id="sc"><persName key="nameid_38" sort="Clarke, Samuel" ref="nameid_38" xml:base="http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/catalogue/xml/persNames.xml">Samuel Clarke</persName></author>

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<note type="metadataLine">1717, <hi rend="italic">c.</hi> 1,979 words.</note>
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<linkGrp n="document_relations" xml:base="http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/normalized/"><ptr type="next_part" target="THEM00232">Mr. Leibniz's Fourth Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr><ptr type="parent" target="THEM00224"><hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)</ptr><ptr type="previous_part" target="THEM00230">Mr. Leibniz's Third Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr></linkGrp>
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<change when="2001-01-01" type="metadata">Catalogue information compiled by Rob Iliffe, Peter Spargo &amp; John Young</change>
<change when="2005-10-01">Base Text of 1738 edition transcribed by <name xml:id="ET">Emily Tector</name></change>
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<head rend="center" xml:id="hd1"><hi rend="italic">Dr</hi>. <hi rend="smallCaps">Clarke'</hi><hi rend="italic">s Third Reply</hi>.</head>
<p xml:id="par1">1. THIS relates only to the <hi rend="italic">Signification</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Words</hi>. The Definitions here given, may well be allowed; And yet <hi rend="italic">Mathematical</hi> Reasonings may be applyed to <hi rend="italic">Physical</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Metaphysical</hi> Subjects.</p>
<p xml:id="par2">2. Undoubtedly nothing <hi rend="italic">is</hi>, without a <hi rend="italic">sufficient</hi> Reason <hi rend="italic">why</hi> it <hi rend="italic">is</hi>, rather than <hi rend="italic">not</hi>; and <hi rend="italic">why</hi> it is <hi rend="italic">Thus</hi>, rather than <hi rend="italic">Otherwise</hi>. But in things in their own Nature indifferent; <hi rend="italic">mere Will</hi>, without any thing External to influence it, is alone <hi rend="italic">That sufficient Reason</hi>. As in the Instance of God's creating or placeing any particle of matter in <hi rend="italic">One</hi> place rather than in <hi rend="italic">Another</hi>, when <hi rend="italic">All</hi> places are Originally alike. And the Case is the same, even though <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> were nothing <hi rend="italic">real</hi>, but only the <hi rend="italic">mere Order of Bodies:</hi> For still it would be absolutely <hi rend="italic">indifferent</hi>, and there could be <hi rend="italic">no other reason</hi> but mere <hi rend="italic">Will</hi>, why Three equal Particles should be placed or ranged in the Order <hi rend="italic">a, b, c,</hi> rather than in the <hi rend="italic">contrary</hi> Order. <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">And</fw><pb xml:id="p75" n="75"/>And therefore no Argument can be drawn from this <hi rend="italic">Indifferency</hi> of <hi rend="italic">All</hi> places, to prove that <hi rend="italic">no Space</hi> is <hi rend="italic">real</hi>. For <hi rend="italic">different Spaces</hi> are really <hi rend="italic">different</hi> or <hi rend="italic">distinct</hi> one from another, though they be perfectly <hi rend="italic">alike</hi>. And there is This evident absurdity in supposing <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> not to be <hi rend="italic">real</hi>, but to be merely the <hi rend="italic">Order of Bodies</hi>; that, according to That Notion, if the Earth and Sun and Moon had been placed where the remotest fixt Stars now are, (provided they were placed in the same Order and Distance they now are <hi rend="italic">with regard one to another</hi>,) it would not only have been, (as this Learned Author rightly says,) <hi rend="italic">la même chose</hi>, the <hi rend="italic">same Thing in effect</hi>; which is very true: But it would also follow, that they would <hi rend="italic">Then</hi> have been in the same <hi rend="italic">Place</hi> too, as they are <hi rend="italic">Now:</hi> Which is an express Contradiction. <space extent="13" unit="chars"/> The <note n="‖"><hi rend="italic">This was occasioned by a Passage in the private Letter, wherein Mr</hi>. Leibnitz'<hi rend="italic">s Third Paper came inclosed</hi>.</note> <hi rend="italic">Ancients</hi> did not call <hi rend="italic">All Space which is void of Bodies</hi>, but only <hi rend="italic">extramundane</hi> Space, by the Name of <hi rend="italic">Imaginary</hi> Space. The meaning of which, is not, <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">that</fw><pb xml:id="p77" n="77"/>that such Space is <note n="*"><hi rend="italic">Of</hi> Nothing, <hi rend="italic">there are no</hi> Dimensions, <hi rend="italic">no</hi> Magnitude, <hi rend="italic">no</hi> Quantity, <hi rend="italic">no</hi> Properties.</note><hi rend="italic">not real</hi>; but only that We are wholly ignorant <hi rend="italic">what</hi> kinds of Things are <hi rend="italic">in that Space</hi>. Those Writers, who by the Word, <hi rend="italic">imaginary</hi>, meant at any time to <hi rend="italic">affirm</hi> that Space was not real; did not thereby <hi rend="italic">prove</hi>, that it was not real.</p> 
<p xml:id="par3">3. <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is not a <hi rend="italic">Being</hi>, an eternal and infinite <hi rend="italic">Being</hi>, but a <hi rend="italic">Property</hi>, or a <note n="✝"><hi rend="italic">See</hi> below, <hi rend="italic">the</hi> Note <hi rend="italic">on my Fourth Reply</hi>, § 10.</note>consequence of the Existence of a Being infinite and eternal. <hi rend="italic">Infinite Space</hi>, is <hi rend="italic">Immensity</hi>: But <hi rend="italic">Immensity</hi> is <hi rend="italic">not God:</hi> And therefore <hi rend="italic">Infinite Space</hi>, is <hi rend="italic">not God</hi>. Nor is there any Difficulty in what is here alledged about Space having <hi rend="italic">Parts</hi>. For Infinite Space is <hi rend="italic">One</hi>, absolutely and essentially <hi rend="italic">indivisible:</hi> And to suppose it <hi rend="italic">parted</hi>, is a contradiction in Terms; because there must be Space in the <hi rend="italic">Partition  it self</hi>; which is to suppose it <note n="‖"><hi rend="italic">See above</hi>, § 4. <hi rend="italic">of my</hi> Second Reply.</note> <hi rend="italic">parted</hi>, and yet <hi rend="italic">not parted</hi> at the same time. The <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight"><hi rend="italic">Immensity</hi></fw><pb xml:id="p79" n="79"/><hi rend="italic">Immensity</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Omnipresence</hi> of <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, is no more a dividing of his Substance into <hi rend="italic">Parts</hi>; than his <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi>, or continuance of existing, is a dividing of his existence into <hi rend="italic">Parts</hi>. There is no difficulty here, but what arises from the <hi rend="italic">figurative</hi> Abuse of the Word, <hi rend="italic">Parts</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par4">4. If <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> was nothing but the <hi rend="italic">Order of Things coexisting</hi>; it would follow, that if God should remove in a streight Line the whole Material World Entire, with any swiftness whatsoever; yet it would still always continue in the <hi rend="italic">same Place</hi>: And that nothing would receive any Shock upon the most sudden stopping of that Motion. And if <hi rend="italic">Time</hi> was nothing but the <hi rend="italic">Order of Succession</hi> of created Things; it would follow, that if God had created the World Millions of Ages sooner than he did, yet it would not have been created <hi rend="italic">at all the sooner</hi>. Further: <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Time</hi> are <hi rend="italic">Quantities</hi>; which <hi rend="italic">Situation</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Order</hi> are <hi rend="italic">not</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par5">5. The Argument in This Paragraph, is; That because <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is <hi rend="italic">Uniform</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Alike</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">One Part</hi> does not differ from <hi rend="italic">another</hi>; therefore the Bodies created in <hi rend="italic">One place</hi>, if they had been created in <hi rend="italic">Another</hi> place, (supposing them to keep the same Situation with regard to each other,) would still have been created in the <hi rend="italic">Same Place</hi> as before: Which is a manifest Contradiction. The <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight"><hi rend="italic">Uniformity</hi></fw><pb xml:id="p81" n="81"/>Uniformity <hi rend="italic">Uniformity</hi> of Space, does indeed prove, that there could be no <hi rend="italic">(External)</hi> reason, why God should create things in <hi rend="italic">One</hi> place rather than in <hi rend="italic">another:</hi> But does That hinder his own <hi rend="italic">Will</hi>, from being to it self a <hi rend="italic">sufficient reason</hi> of Acting in <hi rend="italic">Any</hi> place, when <hi rend="italic">All</hi> Places are Indifferent or Alike; and there be <hi rend="italic">Good reason</hi> to Act in <hi rend="italic">Some</hi> place?</p>
<p xml:id="par6">6. The <hi rend="italic">Same Reasoning</hi> takes Place here, as in the foregoing.</p>
<p xml:id="par7">7 <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 8. Where there is any <hi rend="italic">Difference</hi> in the <hi rend="italic">Nature of things</hi>, there the Consideration of That Difference always determines an Intelligent and perfectly wise Agent. But when Two ways of Acting are equally and alike good, (as in the Instances before mentioned;) to affirm in such case, that God <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 4.</note> <hi rend="italic">cannot Act at all</hi>, or that 'tis no Perfection in him to be <hi rend="italic">able to Act</hi>, because he can have no External Reason to move him to Act <hi rend="italic">one way</hi> rather than <hi rend="italic">the other</hi>, seems to be a denying God to have in himself any <hi rend="italic">Original</hi> Principle or <hi rend="italic">Power</hi> of <hi rend="italic">beginning</hi> to act, but that he must <choice><sic>neds</sic><corr>need</corr></choice> (as it were <hi rend="italic">Mechanically</hi>) be always determined by things extrinsick.</p>
<p xml:id="par8">9. I suppose, <hi rend="italic">That determinate Quantity of Matter</hi>, which is <hi rend="italic">now</hi> in the World, is the <hi rend="italic">most Convenient</hi> for the <hi rend="italic">present Frame of Nature</hi>, or the <hi rend="italic">Present State of Things</hi>: And that a <hi rend="italic">Greater</hi> (as well as a <hi rend="italic">Less</hi>) <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">Quantity</fw><pb xml:id="p83" n="83"/>Quantity of Matter, would have made the <hi rend="italic">Present Frame</hi> of the World <hi rend="italic">less Convenient</hi>; and consequently would not have been a greater Object for God to have exercised his Goodness upon.</p>
<p xml:id="par9">10. The Question is not, what <hi rend="italic">Goclenius</hi>, but what Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac Newton</hi> means by the word <hi rend="italic">Sensorium</hi>, when the Debate is about the Sense of <note n="*"><hi rend="italic">See the</hi> Note on § 3. <hi rend="italic">in my</hi> First Reply.</note> Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac Newton</hi>'s, and not about the Sense of <hi rend="italic">Goclenius</hi>'s Book. If <hi rend="italic">Goclenius</hi> takes the <hi rend="italic">Eye</hi>, or <hi rend="italic">Ear</hi>, or any other <hi rend="italic">Organ</hi> of Sensation, to be the <hi rend="italic">Sensorium</hi>; he is certainly mistaken. But when any Writer <hi rend="italic">expresly explains</hi> what he means by any Term of Art; of What Use is it, in this case, to enquire in what different Senses perhaps some <hi rend="italic">other</hi> Writers have sometimes used the same Word? <hi rend="italic">Scapula</hi> explains it by <hi rend="italic">domicilium</hi>, the <hi rend="italic">place</hi> where the Mind resides.</p>
<p xml:id="par10">11. The Soul of a Blind Man does for This reason not see, because no Images are conveyed (there being some Obstruction in the way) to the <hi rend="italic">Sensorium</hi> where the Soul is present. <hi rend="italic">How</hi> the Soul of a Seeing Man, sees the Images to which it is <hi rend="italic">present</hi>, we know not: But we are sure it cannot perceive what it is <hi rend="italic">not present</hi> to; because no<lb type="hyphenated" xml:id="l1"/><fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">thing</fw><pb xml:id="p85" n="85"/>thing can Act, or be Acted upon, where it Is not.</p>
<p xml:id="par11">12. <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, being <hi rend="italic">Omnipresent</hi>,is really <hi rend="italic">present</hi> to every thing, <hi rend="italic">Essentially</hi> and <note n="*">Deus Omnipræsens est, non per <hi rend="italic">virtutem</hi> solam, sed etiam per <hi rend="italic">Substantiam:</hi> Nim virtus sine Substantiâ subsistere non potest. i. e. <hi rend="italic">God is Omnipresent, not only</hi> virtually, <hi rend="italic">but</hi> substantially: <hi rend="italic">For</hi>, Powers <hi rend="italic">cannot subsist without a</hi> Substance. <hi rend="italic">Newtoni Principia, Scholium generale sub finem</hi>.</note> <hi rend="italic">Substantially</hi>. His Presence <hi rend="italic">manifests</hi> it self indeed by its <hi rend="italic">Operation</hi>, but it could not operate if it was not <hi rend="italic">There</hi>. The <hi rend="italic">Soul</hi> is not Omnipresent to every part of the Body, and therefore does not and cannot it self actually Operate upon every part of the Body, but only upon the Brain, or certain Nerves and Spirits, which, by Laws and Communications of God's appointing, influence the whole Body.</p>
<p xml:id="par12">13. <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 14. The <note n="✝"><hi rend="italic">Note: The word</hi>, Active Force, <hi rend="italic">signifies here nothing but</hi> Motion, <hi rend="italic">and the</hi> Impetus <hi rend="italic">or</hi> relative impulsive Force <hi rend="italic">of Bodies, arising from and being proportional to their Motion. For, the</hi> Occasion <hi rend="italic">of what has passed upon This Head, was the</hi> following <hi rend="italic">Passage</hi>. Apparet Motum &amp; nasci posse &amp; perire. Verùm, per tenacitatem corporum fluidorum, partium<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> suarum Attritum, vis<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> elasticæ in corporibus solidis imbecillitatem; multò magis in eam semper partem vergit natura rerum, ut pereat Motus, quàm ut nascatur. — Quoniam igitur varij illi Motus, qui in Mundo conspiciuntur, perpetuò decrescunt universi; necesse est <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">prorsus</fw><pb xml:id="p87-note" n="87"/> prorsus, quo ij conservari &amp; recrescere possint, ut ad <hi rend="italic">actuosa</hi> aliqua Principia recurramus. i.e. <hi rend="italic">Tis evident, that Motion can in the Whole both increase and diminish. But because of the Tenacity of Fluid Bodies, and the Attrition of their Parts, and the Weakness of elastick Force in Solid Bodies; Motion is, in the Nature of things, always much more apt to</hi> diminish, <hi rend="italic">than to</hi> increase.— <hi rend="italic">Since therefore all the various Motions that are in the World, are perpetually</hi> decreasing; <hi rend="italic">'tis absolutely necessary, in order to preserve and renew those Motions, that we have recourse to some</hi> Active <hi rend="italic">Principles</hi>. Newtoni Optice, Quæst. ult. pag. 341, 343.</note> <hi rend="italic">Active Forces</hi>, which are in the Universe, <hi rend="italic">diminishing themselves</hi> <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">so</fw><pb xml:id="p87" n="87"/>so as to stand in need of <hi rend="italic">new impressions</hi>; is no inconvenience, no disorder, no imperfection in the Workmanship of the Universe; but is the consequence of the Nature of <hi rend="italic">dependent</hi> Things. Which Dependency of Things, is not a matter that wants to be rectified. The Case of a <hi rend="italic">Humane</hi> Workman making a Machine, is quite another thing: Because the <hi rend="italic">Powers</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Forces</hi> by which the Machine continues to move, are altogether <hi rend="italic">independent</hi> on the Artificer.</p>
<p xml:id="par13">15. The Phrase, <hi rend="italic">Intelligentia supramundana</hi>, may well be allowed, as it is here explained: But <hi rend="italic">without</hi> this explication, the expression is very apt to lead to a wrong Notion, as if God was not <hi rend="italic">really</hi> and <hi rend="italic">substantially</hi> present every where.</p>
<p xml:id="par14">16. To the Questions here proposed, the Answer is: <hi rend="italic">That</hi> God does always act in the most <hi rend="italic">regular</hi> and <hi rend="italic">perfect</hi> manner: <hi rend="italic">That</hi> <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">there</fw><pb xml:id="p89" n="89"/>there are no <hi rend="italic">Disorders</hi> in the Workmanship of God; and <hi rend="italic">that</hi> there is nothing more extraordinary in the <hi rend="italic">Alterations</hi> he is pleased to make in the Frame of things, than in his <hi rend="italic">continuation</hi> of it: <hi rend="italic">That</hi> in things in their own nature absolutely Equal and Indifferent, the Will of God can freely choose and determine it self, <hi rend="italic">without any External Cause</hi> to impell it; and <hi rend="italic">that</hi> 'tis a <hi rend="italic">Perfection</hi> in God, to be <hi rend="italic">able</hi> so to do. <hi rend="italic">That</hi> Space, does not at all depend on the <hi rend="italic">Order</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Situation</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Existence</hi> of Bodies. And as to the Notion of <hi rend="italic">Miracles</hi>,</p>
<p xml:id="par15">17. The Question is not, <hi rend="italic">what</hi> it is that <hi rend="italic">Divines</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Philosophers</hi> usually allow or not allow; but <hi rend="italic">what Reasons</hi> Men alledge for their Opinions. If a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi> be That only, which <hi rend="italic">surpasses the Power of all Created Beings</hi>; then for a Man to walk on the Water, or for the Motion of the Sun or the Earth to be stopped, is <hi rend="italic">no Miracle</hi>; since none of these things require <hi rend="italic">infinite</hi> Power to effect them. For a Body to move in a Circle round a Center <hi rend="italic">in Vacuo</hi>; if it be <hi rend="italic">usual</hi> (as the <hi rend="italic">Planets</hi> moving about the <hi rend="italic">Sun</hi>,) 'tis <hi rend="italic">no Miracle</hi>, whether it be effected immediately by <hi rend="italic">God himself</hi>, or mediately by any <hi rend="italic">Created Power:</hi> But if it be <hi rend="italic">unusual</hi>, (as, for a <hi rend="italic">heavy Body</hi> to be suspended, and move so in the <hi rend="italic">Air</hi>,) 'tis equally a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi>, whether it be effected imme<lb type="hyphenated" xml:id="l2"/><fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">diately</fw><pb xml:id="p91" n="91"/>diately by <hi rend="italic">God himself</hi>, or mediately by any invisible <hi rend="italic">Created Power</hi>. <space extent="5" unit="chars"/> Lastly; if whatever arises not from, and is not explicable by, the Natural Powers of Body, be a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi>; then <hi rend="italic">Every animal-motion</hi> whatsoever, is a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi>. Which seems demonstrably to show, that this Learned Author's Notion of a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi> is erroneous.</p>
<fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">Mr. <hi rend="smallCaps">Leib-</hi></fw>
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